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This report is some 300 pages long

Here we reproduce its conclusions and recommendations in the interests of efficiency...



NATO, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom

1. We conclude that, particularly bearing in mind that this is the first ever NATO

deployment outside of NATO's 'area', this has now become a most critical and

seminal moment for the future of the Alliance. We also conclude that the failure of

some NATO allies to ensure that the burden of international effort in Afghanistan is

shared equitably has placed an unacceptable strain on a handful of countries. We

further conclude that there is a real possibility that without a more equitable

distribution of responsibility and risk, NATO's effort will be further inhibited and its

reputation as a military alliance, capable of undertaking out-of-area operations,

seriously damaged. We recommend that the British Government should continue to

exert pressure on NATO partners to remove national caveats and to fulfil their

obligations. We further recommend that where NATO allies are unwilling to

commit combat troops, they must be persuaded to fulfil their obligations in ways

which nevertheless contribute to the overall ISAF effort, for example, by providing

appropriate support including equipment and enhanced training for the Afghan

National Army. (Paragraph 23)

2. We conclude that no matter how difficult the circumstances facing the military in

Afghanistan, the use of air power and acts of considerable cultural insensitivity on

the part of some Coalition Forces over an extended period have done much to shape

negative perceptions among ordinary Afghans about the military and the

international effort in Afghanistan. This problem has caused damage, both real and

perceived, that will in many instances be difficult to undo. We further conclude that

recent policy changes which aim to improve procedures, combined with the

commitment of senior military figures to adopting better practices, are a welcome

development. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government

supply us with detailed information on measures that are being taken by Coalition

Forces in Afghanistan to provide more pro-active and appropriate protection of

civilians in the future. (Paragraph 29)

3. We conclude that the conditions under which prisoners and detainees are treated

once in the hands of the Afghan authorities are a matter of considerable concern. We

will deal with the issue of treatment of those detained by British forces further in our

forthcoming annual Report on human rights. (Paragraph 33)

The role of the United Nations

4. We conclude that while the British Government's support of the UN and for

proposals for the UN to play a more significant role as the overarching co-ordinator

of the international community's efforts in Afghanistan are to be welcomed, it

remains to be seen whether this will involve significant improvements in practice.

We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government states what

4 Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan

evidence there is, if any, of actual improvements in international co-ordination.

(Paragraph 39)

The role of the European Union

5. We conclude that the EU's effort in Afghanistan thus far has not lived up to its

potential. We further conclude that there is a need for the EU and its Member States

to address the lack of coherence which exists within the EU effort if it is to have a

greater impact in the future. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the

Government should supply us with updated information on the progress it has made

in persuading EU Member States and the European Commission to harmonise and

co-ordinate their activities within Afghanistan. (Paragraph 44)

The US and its policy on Afghanistan under the Bush Administration

6. We conclude that some, though certainly not all, of the responsibility for problems in

Afghanistan since 2001 must be attributed to the direction of US policy in the years

immediately after the military intervention in 2001. The unilateralist tendencies of

the US under the Bush administration, and its focus on military goals to the

exclusion of many other strategically important issues, set the tone for the

international community's early presence in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 49)

Regional neighbours

7. We recommend that the Government continues to make clear to the Iranian

leadership the total unacceptability to the UK of Iran's direct and indirect assistance

to the Taliban in their operations against Coalition Forces. (Paragraph 53)

8. We conclude that the FCO should continue to use its influence to foster greater co-

operation between Afghanistan and its neighbours and recommend that in its

response to this Report it updates us on recent developments in this respect.

(Paragraph 61)


The security situation

9. We conclude that the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the south

where the majority of British troops are based, will remain precarious for some time

to come. We further conclude that the current instability is having a damaging effect

on Coalition Forces and efforts to engage in reconstruction and development.

(Paragraph 65)

Afghan Security Forces

10. We conclude that the steady progress being made towards the creation of the Afghan

National Army stands in sharp contrast to the disappointingly slow pace on police

reform, for which Germany was the 'lead nation' before responsibility was

transferred to EUPOL. As a consequence, the United States has considered it has no

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan 5

option but to invest a considerable amount of effort and resource in police reform,

with assistance and training provided by the US military. We further conclude that

military-led reform of civilian police institutions, no matter how well-intentioned,

must run the risk of creating a paramilitary-style police as opposed to the civilian

force which was originally envisaged and which will be needed in the future.

(Paragraph 79)

Governance, justice and human rights

11. We conclude that the failure to create an effective formal justice system as promised

in the Bonn Agreement means that many Afghans remain reliant on traditional,

informal mechanisms of justice. We welcome the Government's policy of developing

links between formal and informal mechanisms of justice providing that full access,

including to decision-taking, is sought for women in both mechanisms. However, we

further conclude that the Government must guard against inadvertently endorsing

any measures which could lead to the introduction, through informal mechanisms,

of extreme forms of justice which retard or even reverse the slow progress that has

been made towards promoting internationally accepted standards of human rights in

Afghanistan. (Paragraph 88)

12. We conclude that almost eight years after the international community became

involved in Afghanistan, virtually no tangible progress has been made in tackling the

endemic problem of corruption, and that in many cases the problem has actually

become worse. We further conclude that policy commitments, action plans and all

manner of strategies are of little value if they are not accompanied by the political

will on the part of the Afghan President and government to drive forward change

and tackle corruption at senior levels. Although corruption is a worldwide problem,

the situation in Afghanistan is particularly bad and requires an Afghan-led solution if

it is to be significantly reduced. (Paragraph 94)

13. We conclude that while much effort has been expended by Western governments on

promoting human rights in Afghanistan, the underlying dynamics and cultural views

in Afghanistan, amongst men in particular, have not shifted to any great extent. As

long as security remains poor, human rights protection will not be considered a

priority by many Afghans. (Paragraph 100)

14. We conclude that the proposed "Shia family law" which would have legalised rape

within marriage and legitimised the subjugation of Shia women in Afghanistan,

represented an affront to decent human values. We further conclude that it is a

matter for alarm that these proposals were considered to be acceptable by President

Karzai, by a majority in the Afghan parliament, and by significant elements of

Afghan public opinion. This episode highlights the challenges that Afghan women

continue to face in realising their basic human rights nearly eight years after the fall

of the Taliban government. We conclude that this proposed law has had a

detrimental affect on international perceptions of Afghanistan. We welcome the

British Government's announcement that it considers those aspects of the law which

undermine human rights to be wholly unacceptable. We recommend that the

Government keeps us fully informed if the Shia Family Law takes legal effect and, if it

does, provides us with an analysis as to whether it has been brought in line with the

6 Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghan Constitution, which guarantees equal rights for women, and with the

international treaties to which Afghanistan is a party. (Paragraph 114)


15. We recommend that the Government continues to do its utmost to persuade its

ISAF partners in Afghanistan to give their full support and co-operation to ISAF's

expanded role of conducting operations against drugs facilities and facilitators.

(Paragraph 124)

16. We conclude that in accepting the role of Afghanistan's 'lead' international partner

in respect of counter-narcotics, the UK has taken on a poisoned chalice. There is

little evidence to suggest that recent reductions in poppy cultivation are the result of

the policies adopted by the UK, other international partners or the Afghan

government. While the British Government is to be commended for its broad-

ranging, holistic approach to tackling narcotics in Afghanistan, it is clear that success

depends on a range of factors which lie far beyond the control and resource of the

UK alone. The scale of the problem, the drugs trade's importance to Afghanistan's

economy and its connection to corruption makes any early achievement of the

aspirations set out in the Bonn Agreement highly unlikely. We further conclude that

the lead international role on counter-narcotics should be transferred away from the

UK, and that the Afghan Government should instead be partnered at an

international level by the United Nations and ISAF which are better equipped to co-

ordinate international efforts. (Paragraph 126)

17. We recommend that if the Government accepts our recommendation to relinquish

the role of lead partner nation on counter-narcotics, it ought to re-focus its effort on

facilitating regional co-operation and driving forward diplomatic efforts within

international organisations to tackle the trafficking and processing of drugs.

(Paragraph 129)

Economic and social development

18. We conclude that long-term investment in education for young people of both

genders in Afghanistan is both morally compelling and strategically sensible. It will

enable Afghanistan to create an educated and skilled workforce equipped to develop

the country and reduce its dependency on foreign funding. We recommend that the

Government should consider extending educational twinning programmes to

students in Afghanistan in a bid to foster educational opportunities and improve

mutual understanding between students and teachers in the UK and Afghanistan.

(Paragraph 136)

19. We conclude that in 2009 economic and social development in Afghanistan

continues to lag behind what international donors promised and what, consequently,

Afghans had a right to expect as a result of Western intervention in their country.

We further conclude, however, that the success of recently initiated Afghan-led

projects, such as the National Solidarity Programme, which appear to offer a highly

effective model for delivering change, is encouraging. We welcome the British

Government's support of this and similar initiatives which are having an impact on

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan 7

the lives of large numbers of people in rural Afghanistan. We recommend that the

Government continue to examine how it can encourage other international donors

to support Afghanistan in this way. We further recommend that in its response the

FCO sets out what it considers the most important priorities of the international

community in Afghanistan to be. (Paragraph 140)

The international community's approach and impact

20. We conclude that the international effort in Afghanistan since 2001 has delivered

much less than it promised and that its impact has been significantly diluted by the

absence of a unified vision and strategy, grounded in the realities of Afghanistan's

history, culture and politics. We recognise that although Afghanistan's current

situation is not solely the legacy of the West's failures since 2001, avoidable mistakes,

including knee-jerk responses, policy fragmentation and overlap, now make the task

of stabilising the country considerably more difficult than might otherwise have been

the case. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO sets out what

lessons have been learned from the mistakes made by the international community

over the last seven years. (Paragraph 145)



Pakistan's strategic importance

21. We conclude that Pakistan's strategic importance derives not only from the

sanctuary that its semi-autonomous border areas provide to extremists who seek to

cause instability in Afghanistan, but also because of connections between the border

areas and those involved in international terrorism. We further conclude that it is

difficult to overestimate the importance of tackling not just the symptoms but the

root causes that enable this situation to persist. (Paragraph 158)

22. We conclude that allegations raised during our inquiry about the safety of nuclear

technology and claims of possible collusion between Pakistan's intelligence agency,

the ISI, and Al Qaeda are a matter of deep concern. We recommend that in its

response to this Report, the Government sets out its assessment of these allegations

and the extent of the threat that this poses. (Paragraph 160)

Recent Pakistani responses to militancy

23. We conclude that there is a pressing need for the Pakistani government to address

the role that some madrassahs play in the recruitment and radicalisation process in

Pakistan. We recommend that the British Government sets out in its response to this

Report what discussions it has had with the Pakistani Government about this issue,

and whether it has raised allegations of Saudi Arabian funding of radical madrassahs

with the Saudi authorities. (Paragraph 164)

24. We conclude that Pakistan's civilian government has recently taken some important

steps to counter insurgency at a considerable cost in terms of military lives lost. We

welcome the increasing recognition at senior levels within the Pakistani military of

8 Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan

the need for a recalibrated approach to militancy but we remain concerned that this

may not necessarily be replicated elsewhere within the army and ISI. We conclude

that President Zardari's recent remarks that he regards the real threat to his country

as being terrorism rather than India are to be welcomed. However, we further

conclude that doubts remain as to whether the underlying fundamentals of Pakistani

security policy have changed sufficiently to realise the goals of long-term security and

stability in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 176)

Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan

25. We conclude that addressing long-standing concerns of the Pashtun populace on

either side of the Durand Line and the respective governments of Afghanistan and

Pakistan in relation to the Durand Line itself, could, in the long term, help to

increase bilateral co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, reduce sources of

political friction and help tackle the causes, and not just the symptoms, of poverty

and weak governance which Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups have exploited so

effectively in recent years. Given the UK's close relationship with both Afghanistan

and Pakistan and its historical ties to the region (which include the imposition of the

Durand Line by British colonial administrators), we further conclude that the UK

has a moral imperative to provide whatever diplomatic or practical support might be

deemed appropriate by the relevant parties to assist them in finding ways of

addressing the many problematic issues that are the Durand Line's legacy.

(Paragraph 182)

US attacks on targets in Pakistan

26. We conclude that the use of US drones to attack Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan may

have resulted in serious damage to Al Qaeda's network and capabilities. However, we

also conclude that these attacks have damaged the US's reputation among elements

of the Pakistani population who regard them as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

We further conclude that drone attacks remain a high-risk strategy and must not

become a substitute for the challenging yet vital task of building a Pakistani civilian

government counter-terrorist capacity and army capable of conducting counter-

insurgency operations and dealing with extremist threats. (Paragraph 199)


27. We reiterate our previous conclusion from our South Asia Report that the UK

should encourage India and Pakistan to make further progress on the peace process,

but that the Government should not get directly involved in negotiations nor try to

suggest solutions to the question of Kashmir, unless requested to do so by both India

and Pakistan. (Paragraph 201)

28. We conclude that the US plan marks an important and long overdue recalibration of

its relationship with Pakistan. Its emphasis on civilian aid, with appropriate

conditions attached, has the potential to ensure that long term improvements in

Pakistan's political, economic and social capacity limit the appeal of extremism. We

further conclude that it is crucial that the US addresses Pakistan's fears, both

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan 9

legitimate and perceived, relating to India and reassures Pakistan about the extent

and nature of the US's long-term commitment to Pakistan. (Paragraph 211)


The UK's expanding mission in Afghanistan

29. We conclude that the UK's mission in Afghanistan has taken on a significantly

different, and considerably expanded, character since the first British troops were

deployed there in 2001. The UK has moved from its initial goal of supporting the US

in countering international terrorism, far into the realms of counter-insurgency,

counter-narcotics, protection of human rights, and state-building. During our visit

we were struck by the sheer magnitude of the task confronting the UK. We conclude

that there has been significant 'mission creep' in the British deployment to

Afghanistan, and that this has resulted in the British government being now

committed to a wide range of objectives. We further conclude that in its response to

this Report, the Government should set out, in unambiguous terms, its first and most

important priority in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 225)

The UK deployment to Helmand

30. We conclude that the UK deployment to Helmand was undermined by unrealistic

planning at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall departments and

crucially, a failure to provide the military with clear direction. We further conclude

that as the situation currently stands, the "comprehensive approach" is faltering,

largely because the security situation is preventing any strengthening of governance

and Afghan capacity. The very clear conclusion that we took from our visit to

Helmand is that stabilisation need not be complicated or expensive, but it does

require provision of security, good governance, and a belief within the local

population that ISAF forces will outlast the insurgents. (Paragraph 236)

The role of, and impact on, the British armed forces

31. We conclude that the Government must ensure that our armed forces are provided

with the appropriate resources to undertake the tasks requested of them, particularly

in an environment as challenging as Helmand. We further conclude that in spite of

well-documented difficulties, British armed forces are now gradually beginning to

create and sustain the conditions that make it possible to extend good governance

and the rule of law in the most heavily populated areas of Helmand. We conclude

that the support provided by additional equipment and by the US 'surge' of troops in

Helmand will be of considerable assistance, and is greatly to be welcomed.

(Paragraph 248)

The role of FCO staff in Afghanistan

32. We conclude that the ability to engage with Afghans in key local languages is crucial

to the UK's effort in Afghanistan and we are concerned that nearly eight years

after intervening in Afghanistan, the FCO still has no Pashtu speakers. We

recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO sets out why this situation

10 Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan

exists and what it is doing, as a matter of urgency, to rectify the situation. (Paragraph


33. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO provides details of the

length of Postings which it uses in Afghanistan and whether it is considering

introducing longer tour lengths to ensure continuity of knowledge and experience.

(Paragraph 252)



Justifications for the UK's continued presence in Afghanistan

34. We conclude that while the drugs trade has an invidious effect on governance on

Afghanistan and ultimately, through the flow of heroin to the West, has a damaging

impact on the UK, the Government's assessment that the drugs trade in Afghanistan

is a strategic threat to the UK which, in part, merits the UK's continued military

presence in Afghanistan, is debatable. (Paragraph 274)

35. We conclude that the expansion of the stated justifications for the UK's mission in

Afghanistan since 2001 has made it more difficult for the Government to

communicate the basic purpose of the mission and this risks undermining support

for the mission both in the UK and in Afghanistan. We welcome the Government's

recognition that its strategy must be grounded in realistic objectives. However, it is

not easy to see how this can be reconciled with the open-ended and wide-ranging

series of objectives which form the current basis for UK effort in Afghanistan. We

recommend that in the immediate future the Government should re-focus its efforts

to concentrate its limited resources on one priority, namely security. (Paragraph


36. We conclude that there can be no question of the international community

abandoning Afghanistan, and that the issues at stake must therefore be how best the

UK and its allies can allocate responsibilities and share burdens so as to ensure that

the country does not once again fall into the hands of those who seek to threaten the

security of the UK and the West. We further conclude that the need for the

international community to convey publicly that it intends to outlast the insurgency

and remain in Afghanistan until the Afghan authorities are able to take control of

their own security, must be a primary objective. (Paragraph 279)

The UK's strategy for Pakistan

37. We welcome the Prime Minister's announcement of £10 million to support the

Pakistani government's counter terrorism efforts and we recommend that the

Government intensifies its help to Pakistan in this area. (Paragraph 289)

38. We conclude that the Government is correct to place a heavy emphasis on Pakistan

in its new strategy for Afghanistan, published in April 2009, and to seek to build on

the broad engagement that the UK has had with Pakistan in relation to counter-

terrorism since 2001. We welcome the focus on long-term solutions and the

Government's commitment to assisting Pakistan to strengthen its civilian

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan 11

institutions. We conclude the balance of the UK's relationship with Pakistan

particularly regarding its co-operation on counter-terrorism has to be improved.

(Paragraph 294)

39. We recommend that the Government should consider how best it can work with

allies to develop an international policy for assisting the Pakistani government in

dealing with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. (Paragraph 295)

40. We recommend that it its response to this Report, the Government provides us with

an update on what measures it is implementing in Pakistan to strengthen the

integrity of its visa application and processing operations against fraudulent

applications and to what extent and in what ways it is co-operating with the UK

Borders Agency on this matter. (Paragraph 297)


41. We conclude that a negotiated, Afghan-led political settlement with broad popular

support represents the only realistic option for long-term security and stability in

Afghanistan. However, we further conclude that there can be no serious prospect of

meaningful discussions until Coalition Forces and the Afghan National Security

Forces gain, and retain, the upper hand on security across the country, including in

Helmand, and are then able to negotiate from a position of strength. For these

reasons we conclude that the current increased military activity is a necessary pre-

requisite for any long-term political settlement. (Paragraph 311)

42. We welcome the commitment of the US and UK governments to ensuring that

human rights are not undermined in any future reconciliation process and we

conclude that the meaningful participation of women is an essential element in any

negotiated reconciliation, as has been the case in many other post-conflict peace

processes. (Paragraph 3180

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