Thursday, 27 January 2022
Up-to-the-minute perspectives on defence, security and peace
issues from and for policy makers and opinion leaders.

     |      View our Twitter page at     |     


by Ted R. Bromund
Executive Summary of a Heritage paper

The British armed forces are too weak and are becoming weaker. Since 1999, British forces have been continually in action around the world, but Britain is spending a lower share of its national income on defense than at any point since 1933. Britain has adopted defense doctrines that empha­size low-intensity war as a way to justify spending less on its forces, and it is being pulled into a tooth­less European defense plan. All of its services are shrinking, and they are poorly served by a procure­ment system that is a disguise for a system of social and corporate welfare. The Ministry of Defence is no longer a leading office of state, and it lacks the polit­ical strength and institutional culture to do its job. In short, Britain is in danger of becoming just another European state that fails to take defense seriously.

The Special Relationship. This matters pro­foundly to the United States. Military and intelli­gence cooperation has been at the heart of the special relationship between the U.S. and Britain since World War II. The U.S. and Britain played the crucial roles in founding NATO in 1949 and in sus­taining that alliance over the past 50 years. NATO, and the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Western democracies that it represents, continues to be central to U.S. policy. Yet without a strong Brit­ain, NATO will have no European state committed to spending a significant amount of money on its own defense. Nor will the British armed forces be able to play their traditional role of deterring adver­saries. This will further weaken NATO and continue the gradual retreat of the state that since 1939 has been the essential friend of the United States and of the values of democracy and free enterprise.

Both Britain and the U.S. must act to renew the transatlantic bargain on defense that was made in 1949. That bargain has been based on a U.S. willing­ness to help the Europeans defend themselves, as long as the Europeans were strongly committed to their own defense. That bargain is now in jeopardy.

For Britain, change must begin at the top. With­out change in the Ministry of Defence and above all a powerful Secretary of State for Defence dedicated to fixing its culture, restoring funding to the services, amending its doctrine, and reforming its procure­ment system, none of the problems confronting the British armed forces can be addressed. If the British political system cannot summon the necessary will to restore its military, Britain will join the ranks of the European states that cannot be bothered to defend themselves and that treat security—the first duty of the state—as a negligible responsibility.

What the United States Should Do. The U.S. should help any British administration that is seri­ous about restoring its armed forces. It can do this in several ways. In public diplomacy, it should con­tinue to emphasize that the U.S. has a vital interest in ensuring that all European members of NATO contribute meaningfully to their own defense. Insti­tutionally, it should reinforce the links between the U.S. and British armed forces and emphasize the importance of interoperability within NATO. Most importantly, it should reform its own procurement and export control systems to give greater emphasis to joint development, manufacturing, and purchas­ing agreements with Britain and to improve the abil­ity of U.S. firms to sell to trusted allies.

If the U.S. continues to treat defense trade coop­eration with Britain as a matter of secondary impor­tance, other countries will take the U.S.'s place as Britain's defense industrial partner. If this happens, U.S. industry will lose orders, U.S. workers will lose jobs, and the U.S. will lose military interoperability with and a vital connection to its closest ally in its most important alliance.

Conclusion. Both the U.S. and Britain need to return to responsibility. The U.S. needs to be a responsible partner in trade and procurement. The U.K. needs to recognize that it is in grave danger of being unable to fulfill its responsibilities to its citi­zens, forces, and friends and allies around the world. Acting together, as they have in the past, the U.S. and Britain can meet these challenges.

(c) Heritage Foundation. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved

Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Inter­national Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Kevin Newak and Alexandra Smith, Heritage Foundation interns, contributed to the research for this Backgrounder.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies on the Defence Viewpoints website. However, if you would like to, you can modify your browser so that it notifies you when cookies are sent to it or you can refuse cookies altogether. You can also delete cookies that have already been set. You may wish to visit which contains comprehensive information on how to do this on a wide variety of desktop browsers. Please note that you will lose some features and functionality on this website if you choose to disable cookies. For example, you may not be able to link into our Twitter feed, which gives up to the minute perspectives on defence and security matters.