Friday, 12 June 2026
AI assisted
The Black Sea Fleet's progressive destruction since 2022 — examined in detail elsewhere in this series — has prompted a question that keeps recurring in defence analysis: why do capable military forces, confronted with evidence that their tactical assumptions are wrong, continue on the same trajectory until the losses become unsustainable? The Russian Navy faced the Neptune anti-ship missile, the Magura V5 unmanned surface vessel, and the Sub Sea Baby underwater drone in succession. Each system demonstrated that existing Russian countermeasures were inadequate. The institutional response was to add boom defences and helicopter patrols rather than to fundamentally reassess.
The French army at Agincourt in 1415 had faced the English longbow at Crécy in 1346 and at Poitiers in 1356. The institutional response was to add armour and more men. On 25 October 1415, on a narrow muddy field in northern France, the consequences of that failure to adapt became irrevocable.
Agincourt repays modern operational analysis not as colourful historical background but as a case study in exactly the failure modes that produce military catastrophe: terrain misread, command dysfunction, technology underestimated, and an enemy consistently undervalued until undervaluing him was no longer possible. The rhyme across six centuries is audible. What follows is an attempt to make it precise.
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Wednesday, 26 April 2023
Robin Ashby
Two embattled countries face similar threats with similar difficulties
From Kyiv to Taipei is 5,000 miles (8,000km). Yet geopolitically, Ukraine and Taiwan are closely linked, writes Edward Lucas. Their biggest shared problem is legitimacy. Russia does not regard Ukraine as a proper country. Vladimir Putin dismissed it as a mere collection of territories in 2008. His cod-historical essay, published in 2021, argued for "historical unity" between Russia and Ukraine, based on a wilful misreading of the history of Kyivan Rus.
Similarly, as seen from Beijing, Taiwan is a rebel province, unfinished business from the civil war that ended on the mainland in 1949. Talk of independence for the self-governing island arouses fury. For their part, the Taiwanese authorities still maintain the decades-old fiction that their formal name is the "Republic of China." But they have long dropped talk of "bandits in temporary control of the mainland,"" which I remember from my teenage years listening to the splenetic shortwave broadcasts of "Voice of Free China".
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Monday, 16 February 2015
Nick Watts
As the civil servants and senior military officials of Britain’s policy community contemplate the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Nick Watts Deputy Director General of the UK Defence Forum spoke to Liam Fox who was the Secretary of State at the MOD at the time of the 2010 SDSR. Fox reflected that when he approached the last defence review he established a template against which the review was carried out. “We looked at costings, operational capability, the cost of regeneration, but particularly the ‘real world’ risk.” He says that for every decision relating to equipment, either in terms of purchase or deletion, the MOD was able to take a number of calculated risks.
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When ministers revisit the decision this time, they will find that the level of these risks will be increased.
• Failing states: This risk has increased most notably Pakistan and Yemen.
• Belligerent states: This risk too has increased notably Russia and North Korea.
• Trans National Terrorism: This is an increased risk with the rise of Al Shabab and Daesh/ISIL among others.
• The risk to global financial stability: Fox believes that this is greater even than a year ago.
• Commodity competition: Has also increased.
• The cyber threat: Is massively increased.
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Friday, 14 April 2023
anatol lieven
The Ukrainian government is now trapped by its own uncompromising—and increasingly indefensible—policy writes Dr Anatol Lieven.
Clear differences are emerging within the Ukrainian government as to whether Ukraine should make the reconquest of Crimea a nonnegotiable goal of its war effort or be prepared to trade at least provisional Russian control of the peninsula for Russian concessions elsewhere. This issue also has the potential to create a deep split between Kyiv and Western governments, which fear that Crimea and control of the strategically vital military base of Sevastopol might be the point on which Moscow would be willing to escalate toward nuclear war. The question is becoming more urgent as Ukraine prepares for an offensive that could potentially allow it to cut the land route between Russia and Crimea.
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Monday, 12 December 2022
Robin Ashby
Unconditional surrender by Russia at the end of the Ukraine War it started seems an entirely fanciful notion. But as Edward Lucas wrote in The Times of London) on 5th December 2022, "Dealing with a defeated Russia will be tricky and western failure so far to prepare for this eventuality is lamentable."
This aide memoire lays out various starting points for such considerations
Contents
* The EU's current policy
* Russia's position
* Ukraine's 10 point peace plan
* The Minsk agreements
* Proposed principles for a new EU-Russia strategy
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Thursday, 10 October 2019
Yevhen Mahda
Everything may become an instrument of hybrid warfare. And electoral processes are no exception. It is well-known that Russia interfered in the Ukrainian election in 2004 which finally led to the Orange revolution. The Russian strategy in Ukraine in 2004 failed and back-fired. But it did not stop the further search for methods of election meddling. It took more than 10 years to create a more sophisticated strategy and tactics, as the article on the next page reviews.
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Saturday, 18 December 2010
Robin Ashby
Editor's note: This is the sixth installment in a series of special reports that Dr. Friedman will write over the next few weeks as he travels to Turkey, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and Poland. In this series, he will share his observations of the geopolitical imperatives in each country and conclude with reflections on his journey as a whole and options for the United States.
By George Friedman
The name "Ukraine" literally translates as "on the edge." It is a country on the edge of other countries, sometimes part of one, sometimes part of another and more frequently divided. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it was divided between Russia, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, it was divided between Russia and Austria-Hungary. And in the 20th century, save for a short period of independence after World War I, it became part of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has been on the edge of empires for centuries.
My father was born in Ukraine in 1912, in a town in the Carpathians now called Uzhgorod. It was part of Austria-Hungary when he was born, and by the time he was 10 the border had moved a few miles east, so his family moved a few miles west. My father claimed to speak seven languages (Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian, Russian and Yiddish). As a child, I was deeply impressed by his learning. It was only later that I discovered that his linguistic skills extended only to such phrases as "What do you want for that scrawny chicken?" and "Please don't shoot."
He could indeed make himself understood in such non-trivial matters in all these languages. Consider the reason: Uzhgorod today is on the Slovakian border, about 30 miles from Poland, 15 miles from Hungary and 50 miles from Romania. When my father was growing up, the borders moved constantly, and knowing these languages mattered. You were never sure what you'd be a citizen or subject of next or who would be aiming a rifle at you.
My father lived on the edge until the Germans came in 1941 and swept everything before them, and then until the Soviets returned in 1944 and swept everything before them. He was one of tens of millions who lived or died on the edge, and perhaps nowhere was there as much suffering from living on the edge than in Ukraine. Ukraine was caught between Stalin and Hitler, between planned famines and outright slaughter, to be relieved only by the grinding misery of post-Stalin communism. No European country suffered as much in the 20th century as Ukraine. From 1914 until 1945, Ukraine was as close to hell as one can reach in this life.
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Saturday, 21 August 2010
Adam
By Lauren Goodrich
Three interlocking crises are striking Russia simultaneously: the highest recorded temperatures Russia has seen in 130 years of recordkeeping; the most widespread drought in more than three decades; and massive wildfires that have stretched across seven regions, including Moscow.
The crises threaten the wheat harvest in Russia, which is one of the world's largest wheat exporters. Russia is no stranger to having drought affect its wheat crop, a commodity of critical importance to Moscow's domestic tranquility and foreign policy. Despite the severity of the heat, drought and wildfires, Moscow's wheat output will cover Russia's domestic needs. Russia will also use the situation to merge its neighbors into a grain cartel.
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