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Should President Obama trust the Mullahs of Iran, asks Nehad Ismail?


A year or so before becoming president, Barak Obama indicated to the New York Times that he would seek co-operation with Iran as a way to extricate the US from the quagmire of Iraq. No such substantive agreement has yet been reached, but with a change in control in the US Senate at the mid term elections possible, pressures are building up rapidly. (Treaties have to be ratified by the Senate)


Iran has been called out by the American liberal press for stalling progress in recent nuclear talks involving Secretary of State John Kerry, Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and Catherine Ashton, the European negotiator, who are due to resume negotiations within a week. 


In May 2009, according to David Frum in the Sunday Times in June 2014, Obama wrote to Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei proposing nuclear talks and unfreezing of relations.


Obama was apparently oblivious to Iran's subversive influence on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Iranian opposition figures I interviewed are amazed at the Obama administration's naivete in adopting the Iranian perspective on the Middle East. The Iranian regime cannot be trusted in conflict resolution or its nuclear intentions. Iran is part of the problem, and has never been part of any solution.


The negotiations' original July 2014 deadline was extended to November 24th, the anniversary of an interim greement. Both sides were publicly committed to a deal. President Rouhani denounced Western-led sanctions in a speech to the General Assembly, but reiterated his wish to resolve the dispute with the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. President Obama put the onus on Iran, warning that a deal can happen only "if Iran seizes this historic opportunity."


In April, President Rouhani said a deal by July was "very likely." And there was optimism in Washington. The Iranian regime is playing for time.
The biggest stumbling block in the last round of negotiations was how much enriched uranium Iran would be allowed to continue producing.
Iran still insists it needs 19,000 centrifuges. Experts believe this number is unnecessary for usage other than nuclear weapons.


Even if Iran finally accepts a substantial reduction to below 5000, does the West really trust Iran? Does President Obama trust Iran?
John R. Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN: "We cannot verify and must not trust Iran's promises on nuclear weapons. Ignore the 'moderate' smokescreen. Sanctions have failed, so our choice is stark: use military force or let Tehran get the bomb".


Iran's state-run Fars news agency reported on May 3rd 2014 that on the eve of arrival of UN nuclear inspectors in Tehran, the Iranian regime's Atomic Energy Organization intended to deny the international inspectors access to Parchin nuclear facility. An explosion had occurred in Parchin a few days previously, killing 2 persons. The IAEA suspects that a decade ago Iran may have carried out explosives tests at Parchin that could be relevant to the development of a nuclear weapons capability. The IAEA wants to visit a specific location at the site, but Iran has not so far granted access.


The Iranian regime's Atomic Energy Organization spokesman, Behrouz Kamalvandi, stated that "legally, they have no right to visit Parchin since we are not implementing the Additional Protocol (to the NPT) and even if we did, access needs to be managed".


According to opposition sources, over the past three years, the IAEA inspectors have frequently requested to visit a certain section of Parchin to study the unknown aspects of the regime's nuclear weapons program, without success.


Barely hours after the signing of an interim agreement in Geneva (24th November 2013) to temporarily freeze Iran's nuclear enrichment programme, President Rouhani said the interim deal recognised Iran's nuclear "rights".


US President Barack Obama welcomed that deal, saying it included "substantial limitations which will help prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon". Iran agreed to give better access to inspectors and halt some of its work on uranium enrichment. According to Al Arabiya News, Iran announced just 24 hours before agreement was reached that it could not accept any agreement that did not recognize its right to enrich uranium, a demand the United States and its European allies have repeatedly rejected.


In March 2014, President Rouhani insisted that Iran would not abandon its enrichment of uranium, after US senators called for it to be denied any such right under a long-term nuclear deal.


Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on 9th April 2014 that Iran will never give up its nuclear programme. He said Iran had agreed to the talks to "break the hostile atmosphere" with the international community.


Meanwhile, John Kerry told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in April that Iran can produce fissile material for an atomic weapon in two months. He later corrected himself, suggesting 6-12 months.


The Arab States in the Gulf region are wary of Iran's real intentions. In Saudi Arabia the perception is that the Iranian nuclear programme is designed to threaten the Kingdom and its allies in the Gulf.


In November 2011 the IAEA published a new report revealing advanced Iranian design for a nuclear warhead developed with the help of former Soviet scientists.


In response to the report. Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for the oil trade that links the Gulf oil-producing states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with the Indian Ocean. The US maintains a naval presence in the Gulf, primarily to ensure the oil routes remain open.


Does the world trust Iran to honour its obligations? Would appeasing Iran work in easing tensions in the region? The belligerent and often conflicting statements coming out of Tehran are not reassuring.


Many experts are not fooled by the charm offense; everybody in the Middle East knows that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Rouhani can smile but his nuclear objective remains unchanged.


Nehad Ismail is a UK-based commentator on Middle Eastern affairs

Previous relevant papers on Defence Viewpoints (www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk)

· Iran : A foreign policy strategy by any other name. Anthony Etchells 1 Dec 11

· Iran 's economy : Through a glass darkly. Nick Watts 4 Oct 11

· Basij – keeping tabs on Irans' students. Nima Khorrami Assl 9 May 11

· Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani and Iran's Assembly of Experts. Alex Shone 25 March 11

· Thinking through Iran's nuclear negotiations. Lauren Williamson 7 Dec 10

· Wars downstream revisited : Tigris-Euphrates co-operation. Jamie Ingram 10 Dec 10

· An introduction to Iran in the 21st Century. Alex Shone 3 Dec 10

· No early strike against Iran's nukes. Matthew Smith 23 April 10

Relevant papers from the U K Defence Forum website www.ukdf.org.uk include

 RS84 Iranian Insight - December 2011

· FS62 Nuclear plans of Iraq – 6th update Feb 2011

- FS71 Iran's nuclear and missile programme 2011-14

· CP62 Iran's nuclear programme – the Russian position 2006

· RS39 Iran's non-nuclear defence procurement 2006

· CP59 Iran's defence of its nuclear programme 2005

· GR142 Iran : Future political landscape 2005

· GR138 Iran on the nuclear threshold 2004

 

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