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Defence Viewpoints from UK Defence Forum

By Chris Newton, Research Associate, U K Defence Forum

At the beginning of 2010, the Conservatives unveiled a series of posters with the slogan 'Year for Change'. 2010 has certainly lived up to that expectation. At the beginning of the year the defence community was in a state of limbo – an election looming, with yet another 4-5 months waiting before the defence review could get underway.

At the end of the year, a new coalition government has established itself and the defence community has (to a degree) some clarity about the future shape of government policy. Furthermore, the government has made good progress in deepening its defence relationships with the US and France. But despite this, it would be difficult to say that our Armed Forces can face the future with any real confidence.

Next year, the historian Niall Ferguson will publish a book arguing that the West is in decline. It is this issue of decline that comes to my mind whenever I read the 2010 Defence White Paper. Will the changes announced signal the next phase of Britain's military decline? Did 2010  represent a turning point in three respects – Britain's military capability; Britain as a nuclear power; and Britain strategic posture?

Britain's military capabilities

The Strategic Defence and Security Review was carried out at a breathtaking pace, completed within only five months, with limited consultation with industry and the wider defence community. Whilst it was meant to be a 'security policy-led' review, the reality was that this review was followed the pattern of most defence reviews in recent history – it was dominated by economics and the government's need to balance its other political priorities with defence.

In the end the government announced that it will cut the MoD budget by 8 per cent over the next four years. To be sure, other government departments fared much worse (and others such as DFID fared much better). But when one considers that ill-fated Nott Review increased the defence budget annually by 3 per cent, and that the MoD struggled to find the 3 per cent annual efficiency savings for the 1998 SDR, it is inevitable that some capabilities will be affected.

So did the government make the right choices? Possibly it was right to make some reductions in armour and heavy artillery. But there are other more worrying concerns. As with the Nott review, the controversial aspect of the Fox review was future aircraft carrier strike capability. Since the National Security Strategy's emphasis was on overseas power projection, was the idea to withdraw the Harrier aircraft and leave a capability gap of nine years sensible?

Like the Nott review, the government is taking a big risk in assuming that we will not need carrier strike capability over the next decade. We might get away with it. But what if this assumption, like that in the Nott review, is wrong? We are not talking about a capability gap of one or two years here, but nearly a decade. A week may be a long time in politics, but nine years is an extremely long time in international politics. Whilst not going as far as the former First Sea Lords in saying that the government has left the Falklands vulnerable to invasion, the pertinent question is : What will the Prime Minister do if he finds that he needs to project seaborne airpower in other parts of the world after all?

Nobody can predict the future. The fact that the North Korea has recently shelled Yeonpyeong island and has threatened to initiate nuclear war on its neighbour shows that the world doesn't stop when it suits the British government. And yet there is an obvious inconsistency in the government's policy. It seems that it is safe for the UK not to have an aircraft carrier in 2019, but it is still vital that the UK has an aircraft carrier in 2020. The logic behind this thinking has not been adequately explained. Indeed, this seems especially odd when the theme of the White Paper was 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty'.

In the longer term, the SDSR heralds a number of milestones, the most important being the reduction of army establishment manpower to below 100,000. This could be another such symbolic indicator of the next stage of Britain's military decline.

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Warrant Officer Class 2 (WO2) Charles Henry Wood from 23 Pioneer Regiment RLC (Royal Logistic Corps), serving with the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force, was killed in Afghanistan on Tuesday 28 December 2010.

WO2 Charles 'Charlie' Wood deployed on Operation HERRICK 13 on 6th November 2010 as an Advanced Search Advisor. Trained to coordinate all aspects of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection, he was assigned to lead the clearance of a route through the Khushdal Kalay area of the Helmand River Valley to increase the freedom of movement and safety of the local population. In the early afternoon of 28 December 2010, with the task nearing completion, Warrant Officer Class 2 Wood was caught in the blast from an IED and killed.

WO2 Charles Henry Wood

WO2 Charles Wood, aged 34, joined the Army in August 1994 and moved to 23 Pioneer Regiment RLC, then part of the Queen's Division. His leadership abilities were recognised early and he gained rapid promotion and subsequent postings to the more prestigious and demanding jobs in his field. Operationally experienced, he completed deployments to Iraq in 2003 and Bosnia in 2007. He was posted from the Army Training Regiment Pirbright to 518 Pioneer Squadron as Sergeant Major in June 2009, and volunteered to lead his Squadron through their search training and on to their deployment to Afghanistan. A talented and successful Warrant Officer with masses of potential, he had Late Entry commissioning firmly in his sight.

An ardent supporter of his home town football club, Middlesborough, he also represented his Regimental team on numerous occasions both on the pitch and, more recently, behind the scenes as trainer and manager. He was a successful fundraiser and raised many thousands of pounds for forces charities. He leaves behind his wife, Heather, his mother, Barbara, his father, John, and his sisters, Samantha and Amanda.

Charlie's wife, Heather Wood, said:

"The family have lost a son, a brother and an uncle and I have lost my loving husband who was also my best friend. Charlie had an infectious personality who made a positive effect on everyone he met; he had a heart of gold and endeared himself to everyone. He will be sorely missed by those who had the good fortune to have met and known him.

"He will be forever in our thoughts for the rest of our lives."

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Davis GM RLC, Commanding Officer Counter-IED Task Force, said of him:

"The death of WO2 Wood has rocked the Counter-IED Task Force; it has taken us all by surprise and the corresponding sense of loss is massive. He was a huge character – a complete live wire – a man who never rested. He was always on the go, constantly thinking ahead, planning the next stage and working out how best to achieve the mission. And who did he do this for? Certainly not for himself; he did it for his men. His Pioneers looked up to him with the utmost respect; he was the archetypal Sergeant Major – firm but always impeccably fair and his 'kids', as he termed the soldiers, all loved him. He was completely selfless and led others as he expected to be led himself, a future RSM if ever I saw one.

"I find it difficult to accept that this fine man has been taken from us; it only seems like yesterday that we sat together in a Forward Operating Base, drinking coffee while he spoke to me of his pride in being one of the first Pioneers to become a Search Advisor and telling me how he couldn't wait to get out onto the ground to complete his first task – he loved what he was undertaking and died in the process of doing his bit to bring normality to Afghanistan.

"It is not I that say this of the Searchers, 'they are exceptional and they display a special type of bravery', they are the words of those they support and those who respect them for the unique and dangerous challenge they face on a daily basis. Our hearts, thoughts and prayers, at this most difficult of times, go out to his adored wife Heather, his parents Barbara and John, his sisters Samantha and Amanda and to his two nieces who he deeply cared for."

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By George Friedman, STRATFOR

The U.S. Senate has given its advice and consent to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which had been signed in April. The Russian legislature still has to provide final approval of the treaty, but it is likely to do so, and therefore a New START is set to go into force. That leaves two questions to discuss. First, what exactly have the two sides agreed to and, second, what does it mean? Let's begin with the first.

The original START was signed July 31, 1991, and reductions were completed in 2001. The treaty put a cap on the number of nuclear warheads that could be deployed. In addition to limiting the number of land- and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers, it capped the number of warheads that were available to launch at 6,000. The fact that this is a staggering number of nuclear weapons should give you some idea of the staggering number in existence prior to START. START I lapsed in 2009, and the new treaty is essentially designed to reinstate it.

It is important to remember that Ronald Reagan first proposed START. His initial proposal focused on reducing the number of ICBMs. Given that the Soviets did not have an effective intercontinental bomber force and the United States had a massive B-52 force and follow-on bombers in the works, the treaty he proposed would have decreased the Soviet quantitative advantage in missile-based systems without meaningfully reducing the U.S. advantage in bombers. The Soviets, of course, objected, and a more balanced treaty emerged.

What is striking is that START was signed just before the Soviet Union collapsed and implemented long after it was gone. It derived from the political realities that existed during the early 1980s. One of the things the signers of both the original START and the New START have ignored is that nuclear weapons by themselves are not the issue. The issue is the geopolitical relationship between the two powers. The number of weapons may affect budgetary considerations and theoretical targeting metrics, but the danger of nuclear war does not derive from the number of weapons but from the political relationship between nations.

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