By Chris Newton, Research Associate, U K Defence Forum
At the beginning of 2010, the Conservatives unveiled a series of posters with the slogan 'Year for Change'. 2010 has certainly lived up to that expectation. At the beginning of the year the defence community was in a state of limbo – an election looming, with yet another 4-5 months waiting before the defence review could get underway.
At the end of the year, a new coalition government has established itself and the defence community has (to a degree) some clarity about the future shape of government policy. Furthermore, the government has made good progress in deepening its defence relationships with the US and France. But despite this, it would be difficult to say that our Armed Forces can face the future with any real confidence.
Next year, the historian Niall Ferguson will publish a book arguing that the West is in decline. It is this issue of decline that comes to my mind whenever I read the 2010 Defence White Paper. Will the changes announced signal the next phase of Britain's military decline? Did 2010 represent a turning point in three respects – Britain's military capability; Britain as a nuclear power; and Britain strategic posture?
Britain's military capabilities
The Strategic Defence and Security Review was carried out at a breathtaking pace, completed within only five months, with limited consultation with industry and the wider defence community. Whilst it was meant to be a 'security policy-led' review, the reality was that this review was followed the pattern of most defence reviews in recent history – it was dominated by economics and the government's need to balance its other political priorities with defence.
In the end the government announced that it will cut the MoD budget by 8 per cent over the next four years. To be sure, other government departments fared much worse (and others such as DFID fared much better). But when one considers that ill-fated Nott Review increased the defence budget annually by 3 per cent, and that the MoD struggled to find the 3 per cent annual efficiency savings for the 1998 SDR, it is inevitable that some capabilities will be affected.
So did the government make the right choices? Possibly it was right to make some reductions in armour and heavy artillery. But there are other more worrying concerns. As with the Nott review, the controversial aspect of the Fox review was future aircraft carrier strike capability. Since the National Security Strategy's emphasis was on overseas power projection, was the idea to withdraw the Harrier aircraft and leave a capability gap of nine years sensible?
Like the Nott review, the government is taking a big risk in assuming that we will not need carrier strike capability over the next decade. We might get away with it. But what if this assumption, like that in the Nott review, is wrong? We are not talking about a capability gap of one or two years here, but nearly a decade. A week may be a long time in politics, but nine years is an extremely long time in international politics. Whilst not going as far as the former First Sea Lords in saying that the government has left the Falklands vulnerable to invasion, the pertinent question is : What will the Prime Minister do if he finds that he needs to project seaborne airpower in other parts of the world after all?
Nobody can predict the future. The fact that the North Korea has recently shelled Yeonpyeong island and has threatened to initiate nuclear war on its neighbour shows that the world doesn't stop when it suits the British government. And yet there is an obvious inconsistency in the government's policy. It seems that it is safe for the UK not to have an aircraft carrier in 2019, but it is still vital that the UK has an aircraft carrier in 2020. The logic behind this thinking has not been adequately explained. Indeed, this seems especially odd when the theme of the White Paper was 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty'.
In the longer term, the SDSR heralds a number of milestones, the most important being the reduction of army establishment manpower to below 100,000. This could be another such symbolic indicator of the next stage of Britain's military decline.











