Was 2010 a turning point in British defence policy?

By Chris Newton, Research Associate, U K Defence Forum

At the beginning of 2010, the Conservatives unveiled a series of posters with the slogan 'Year for Change'. 2010 has certainly lived up to that expectation. At the beginning of the year the defence community was in a state of limbo – an election looming, with yet another 4-5 months waiting before the defence review could get underway.

At the end of the year, a new coalition government has established itself and the defence community has (to a degree) some clarity about the future shape of government policy. Furthermore, the government has made good progress in deepening its defence relationships with the US and France. But despite this, it would be difficult to say that our Armed Forces can face the future with any real confidence.

Next year, the historian Niall Ferguson will publish a book arguing that the West is in decline. It is this issue of decline that comes to my mind whenever I read the 2010 Defence White Paper. Will the changes announced signal the next phase of Britain's military decline? Did 2010  represent a turning point in three respects – Britain's military capability; Britain as a nuclear power; and Britain strategic posture?

Britain's military capabilities

The Strategic Defence and Security Review was carried out at a breathtaking pace, completed within only five months, with limited consultation with industry and the wider defence community. Whilst it was meant to be a 'security policy-led' review, the reality was that this review was followed the pattern of most defence reviews in recent history – it was dominated by economics and the government's need to balance its other political priorities with defence.

In the end the government announced that it will cut the MoD budget by 8 per cent over the next four years. To be sure, other government departments fared much worse (and others such as DFID fared much better). But when one considers that ill-fated Nott Review increased the defence budget annually by 3 per cent, and that the MoD struggled to find the 3 per cent annual efficiency savings for the 1998 SDR, it is inevitable that some capabilities will be affected.

So did the government make the right choices? Possibly it was right to make some reductions in armour and heavy artillery. But there are other more worrying concerns. As with the Nott review, the controversial aspect of the Fox review was future aircraft carrier strike capability. Since the National Security Strategy's emphasis was on overseas power projection, was the idea to withdraw the Harrier aircraft and leave a capability gap of nine years sensible?

Like the Nott review, the government is taking a big risk in assuming that we will not need carrier strike capability over the next decade. We might get away with it. But what if this assumption, like that in the Nott review, is wrong? We are not talking about a capability gap of one or two years here, but nearly a decade. A week may be a long time in politics, but nine years is an extremely long time in international politics. Whilst not going as far as the former First Sea Lords in saying that the government has left the Falklands vulnerable to invasion, the pertinent question is : What will the Prime Minister do if he finds that he needs to project seaborne airpower in other parts of the world after all?

Nobody can predict the future. The fact that the North Korea has recently shelled Yeonpyeong island and has threatened to initiate nuclear war on its neighbour shows that the world doesn't stop when it suits the British government. And yet there is an obvious inconsistency in the government's policy. It seems that it is safe for the UK not to have an aircraft carrier in 2019, but it is still vital that the UK has an aircraft carrier in 2020. The logic behind this thinking has not been adequately explained. Indeed, this seems especially odd when the theme of the White Paper was 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty'.

In the longer term, the SDSR heralds a number of milestones, the most important being the reduction of army establishment manpower to below 100,000. This could be another such symbolic indicator of the next stage of Britain's military decline.

Britain as a nuclear power

The replacement of the nuclear deterrent has been particularly difficult, both in terms of Coalition management and as an issue which divides all three main political parties. The SDSR attempted to get round the differing views of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats by postponing the main investment decision until after the election and delaying the in-service date of the new submarines. This might provide some short term political relief, but it will stir up all kinds of problems for the Conservatives later on.

Concerned Conservative backbenchers are right to point out that it leaves the door open for the Liberal Democrats to demand that any potential coalition partner scrap the Trident replacement programme in the event of a hung parliament in 2015. This decision will leave open the possibility of Britain relinquishing its nuclear status; or at the very least its ability to possess a full-time strategic nuclear deterrent. It may or may not happen. But given the Liberal Democrats' opposition to a 'like for like' replacement, Ed Miliband's ambivalence on the issue, and the fact that some Conservatives are not so enthusiastic about the nuclear deterrent, the possibility of a major change in policy in 2015 is not so unrealistic.

Britain's strategic posture

2010 represented another turning point in Britain's role in Afghanistan, with the decision by the new government to transfer control of key symbolic strongholds such as Musa Qaleh to the Americans. Moreover, David Cameron announced his intention to withdraw all British combat forces from Afghanistan by 2015. Whilst the timeframe may or may not be sensible, many defence commentators rightly question the decision to announce such plans five years before it is due to take place. In many ways it is a curious decision since David Cameron in opposition always maintained that the British withdrawal from Iraq should be on the basis on conditions on the ground, and not a politically defined timetable. And yet we now have an arbitrary combat force withdrawal date which the Taliban can plan from.

What is also important is that this decision reveals the government's attitude to the role of military force in general. The previous Labour government's handling of the Iraq War means that the British public will take a hostile view of any future military actions. Even if the Prime Minister wanted to use military force, it is unlikely that the Deputy Prime Minister will let him. David Cameron has also developed the foreign policy doctrine of 'liberal conservatism' designed to counter 'neo-conservatism' and a means to reassure the British public that he follows a different foreign policy philosophy from that of Tony Blair and George W. Bush.

Providing that events do not take a different turn, it is likely that Britain's foreign policy will return to that of the previous Conservative government after the Gulf War. This will be characterised by extreme caution in the use of military force and a military policy ultimately geared to small-scale peacekeeping operations.

The next stage in Britain's military decline?

In his speech on board HMS Albion in 2007 Tony Blair mentioned that in modern military terms there are two types of nations:

'Those who do war fighting and peacekeeping and those who have, effectively, except in the most exceptional circumstances, retreated to the peacekeeping alone. Britain does both. We should stay that way'.

There is a real danger that the changes made in the SDSR in terms of military capability, nuclear policy, and strategic posture could initiate Britain's transition from being a 'war fighting' nation to a purely 'peacekeeping' one. Indeed, it would be supremely ironic for a Conservative Party that has spent so long vigorously attacking the previous Labour government on defence, only for it to be the initiator of the next stage of Britain's military decline.

The government is hoping that 2011 will be a turning point in MoD management and procurement. They are hoping that by setting up the Defence Reform Unit, through launching a defence industrial consultation process, and by appointing Bernard Gray as Chief of Defence Materiel, they can deliver more 'bang for the British pound'. The challenge is immense and not to be underestimated – for history is against the government, and there are many hurdles to overcome. For example, what is the government's position on turning Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) into a 'government owned contractor operated' entity (a measure passionately advocated by Gray)? And can Bernard Gray really translate a well-written report into definitive action?

But there is an even more fundamental problem. Certainly there is waste in  MoD procurement, and there may be waste in the MoD organisation. But 'efficiency savings' will only go so far. The government cannot ignore the truism that modern warfare is highly expensive, and if Britain wants to maintain its current role in the world then it must pay the price for doing so. And if this government is unable to or does not have the political will to pay that price, it must limit Britain's ambitions and be honest with the British people. The government cannot maintain the façade that Britain can play a significant role in the world if it is taking away the very the means that allows it to do so. The previous government tried to do this and damaged Britain's reputation in counter-insurgency warfare as a result. If this government tries to do something similar then the damage to Britain's military reputation in the world will be far more significant.

The defence community has known for a long while that 2010 will be painful year. All three political parties knew that the 2010 defence review will not receive the positive reception that George Robertson's review of 1998 received. But the decisions made in this year could have consequences that will be felt long after New Years' Day 2011. Whether the SDSR turns out to be a marker in Britain's downward military spiral remains to be seen. And whether Liam Fox can be regarded as a radical reformer like Lord Thorneycroft or an unfortunate risk-taker like John Nott remains to be seen. For that is now a matter for 'events' and the historians.