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by Alex Pritchard-Smith

Whilst the rest of the Western world continues to limp along after the recession, Brazil's economy has experienced rapid growth that will shortly take it above both the UK and France as the world's fifth largest. Such confidence domestically appears to have created a new platform for Brazilian diplomacy to play a role further afield than Latin America, most notably in the Middle East.

These are early days. But in the last year outgoing President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva has directed a new strategy that aims to establish Brazil as a neutral player in the region. Whilst President Lula supported a Brazilian-led Mercosur free trade deal with Israel, his parallel defence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's right to pursue an Iranian nuclear programme triggered criticism, primarily from Washington. As recently as December this year the Brazilian foreign ministry further shocked the Americans and their Israeli allies alike by formally recognising a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. Although not ground-breaking, these actions have given rise to questions over Brazil's neutrality and, more worryingly for President Lula, have had the effect of unsettling traditional players in the Middle East – which could jeopardise future attempts to expand Brazilian influence in a region monopolised by the US.

However on closer inspection Brazilian interest in the region does not appear to be an attempt to muscle its way into serious international politics, but rather a pursuit of new markets for Brazil's booming economy. Iran's nuclear energy programme represents good business for Brazilian aluminium, which in part explains President Lula's support for Ahmadinejad despite the rest of the Western world's concerns. Trade between Brazil and Iran is already worth $2bn annually, with that likely to increase to around $15bn. Moreover Brazilian meat, sugar and ethanol are in high demand across the wider Gulf region, representing an excellent opportunity for President Lula to secure Brazil's expanding economic interests. Israel as well as its Arab neighbours has also benefited from growing Brazilian interest in the Middle East with new agreements outside the Mercosur deal likely to see Israeli-Brazilian trade worth $3bn by 2015, a move that should reassure doubters of Brazil's neutral stance.

As far as further involvement goes, perhaps not too much should be expected of Brazil just yet. The foreign ministry in Brasilia lacks the administrative structure and diplomatic experience to deal with the complexity of religious, political and ideological issues that accompany the Middle East. Furthermore, Brazil barely possesses the capabilities to project force regionally let alone globally. Brazil's contribution towards 'peace' in the region appears limited.

But Brazil's overall strategy in world politics is to cultivate a neutral position that places emphasis on its commercial clout as a means to exert influence. As such these early interventions in the Middle East could be the shape of things to come. Whilst these actions maybe of little consequence now, any positive contributions to the Israel-Palestine conflict or, most significantly, the Iranian nuclear question would see Brazil's strategy in the Middle East gain much credibility. As the only one of the so-called 'BRIC' states to have opted independently not to develop its own nuclear weapon, perhaps Brazil's burgeoning new relationship with Iran will discourage Ahmadinejad from pursuing his own weapon. After all, the example of South Africa, which voluntarily scrapped its own nuclear programme, is often held up as an example.

Even if this is highly unlikely in the case of Iran, Brazil can still have a role in the Middle East, particularly if the US is willing to work with a new partner. And Brazil would certainly be a more desirable voice than either Russia or China as Brasilia is unlikely to challenge US influence directly. The offer of lucrative trade deals with one of the world's emerging economic powers could form part of a carrot and stick approach, in which close co-operation between Washington and Brasilia could become common place in the West's efforts to gain influence over the Arab world.

Alex Pritchard-Smith studies International History and Politics at the University of Leeds. This is an entry in the U K Defence Forum Undergraduate Challenge 2011

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