Strategic Survey 2008 -An Introduction

by Dr John Chipman

This year we have special essays on intelligence reforms in the US and the changes that have taken place also in the UK and an extensive analysis on the strategic issues at stake in the Arctic, in light of the anticipated effects of climate change on new shipping routes and the desire for exploitation of the large oil and gas resources in the area. As always, Strategic Survey analyses the political-strategic trends for the preceding twelve months in all regions of the world and carries very detailed essays on political trends and conflicts throughout the world. Those wishing to understand the rise to power of the Maoists in Nepal, the internal debates in India on the India– US nuclear deal, the shifting domestic politics and impact on regional relationships in Southeast Asia, the politics of China in their Olympic year, the origins of the Kenyan political crisis, the problems of radicalisation in the Maghreb, the diplomatic travails over Kosovo, the internal struggles between the army and political parties in Turkey, the strategic perspectives of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, the nature of leftist politics in Latin America, the debates over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear non-proliferation strategies and great-power politics in general at a time of economic turmoil, can turn to Strategic Survey for crisp reflections and analysis.

Again we have very detailed maps in our Strategic Geography section, and I would alert you in particular to maps on areas of instability in Pakistan, Arctic resources and shipping routes and Gazprom's grip on Europe .

This Strategic Survey went to press in late July, just before the Russian–Georgian war that appeared to change importantly East–West relations. Strategic Survey did not predict this war, though its assessment of the instability in the Caucasus laid out the reasons why it was possible, and its analysis of the deteriorating state of Western–Russian relations anticipated the anger that the Russians would display towards the perceived attempt by Georgia to take advantage of its close relationship to the West to settle the frozen conflicts in its favour.

The Russia–Georgia crisis, as I will argue in a moment, does not usher in a new Cold War. The crisis should invite a more considered strategic analysis by the West and NATO on policy to the East that takes into proper account wider strategic interests and is more specific about what kind of Russian activity it is necessary to deter or prevent. In particular, NATO enlargement policy should be reaffirmed as necessary if it is in the service of NATO strategic interests, a means to an end, not an institutional priority in and of itself. NATO must not transform its expansion policy into a game of Russian roulette. A more immediate priority than planning further enlargement is to provide appropriate strategic reassurance to existing members. A medium-term need is to calculate how best to engage in the Caucasus with Ukraine and with other areas in Russia's neighbourhood. The approach should be regional, not just country-specific. Where there are still frozen conflicts, diplomatic discussions have to be rekindled. In time, NATO and Western countries need to sort out exactly what interests are worth defending and in what manner, and on what issues it may still be possible to collaborate with Russia in order to induce more congenial behaviour in other areas. A strategic approach to Russia must acknowledge, without necessarily accepting, the nature of Russia today and focus Western influence and leverage where it most matters. Western leaders have called for an audit of EU-Russian relations; they may also want to make an audit of what their most important interests are with Russia in current circumstances.

Overview
In general, the leaders of the major powers were mostly pre-occupied during the year by domestic and economic developments: the US with its presidential election, China with the Olympic Games, Russia with a leadership shuffle. The inward focus of many countries was also partly a response to the effects of the triple shock in the markets for credit, oil and food.

As a result, regional actors were able to assume larger conflict-resolution roles for themselves. Turkey began playing a role in facilitating possible peace talks between Israel and Syria. Qatar played a crucial role in mediating between Lebanese groups to allow the assumption to office of the new president of Lebanon. South Africa persisted in its regional mediation to create a power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe. Qatar's and South Africa's diplomatic roles were not necessarily always applauded in the West. The feeling, in both cases, was that the agreements negotiated went too much with the grain of local conditions, the first by granting too much formal power to Hizbullah within the Lebanese system, the second by according too much residual power to President Mugabe. Working too much with the grain of local and international conditions strikes some people as defeatist. Occasionally it is the technique that avoids the worst outcomes. These are the sort of stop-gap measures that are often needed when the bigger diplomatic powers are distracted. A more egalitarian international diplomatic order may not openly be achievable at the UN Security Council, but it is in practice, for better or worse, being established on the ground.

More widely, the year saw grey returning as the main colour on the diplomatic palette, ousting the presumed certainties of black and white to the sidelines. Diplomatic compromise, moderation of strategic objectives, acknowledgement of practical power balances was a general theme. The idealistic and entrepreneurial mode of Western foreign policy is over. How idealism and realpolitik will intermingle in the future will hugely depend on the personality of the future US president. But there is an abiding sense that the age of ambitious democratisation agendas and regional strategic makeovers is behind us.

Iran/North Korea Proliferation Issues
Diplomatic efforts to stem the nuclear proliferation challenges posed by Iran and North Korea are both deadlocked. In defiance of four Security Council resolutions, Iran continues to expand its uranium-enrichment programme, with about 4,000 centrifuges now installed at Natanz and operating fairly well. Iran also continues to resist efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to probe allegations of past design work on nuclear weapons, including foreign help with experiments on a detonator suitable for an implosion-type weapon. In June, Iran was presented with a repackaged incentives proposal, including a 'double freeze' on additional centrifuges and additional sanctions as a face-saving way to start negotiations on a long-term solution. In July, the US floated a plan to post consular officers in Tehran, and sent its third-ranking diplomat to Geneva for preliminary discussions with Iran led by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Iran responded with positive words but no expressed willingness to limit its nuclear programme. Frustrated at the lack of a substantive reply, the US and its allies vowed to pursue a new sanctions resolution in the Security Council.

The prospect for significantly tougher UN sanctions was never strong, however, and is less so in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis. Pressure on Iran will grow, but largely outside the auspices of the UN. The next year could see Iran reaching the kind of threshold capability that would seriously worry Israel and rekindle talk of potential military action.

It will take North Korea less than one year to undo the steps that up until August it was taking to disable its declared nuclear facilities. Pyongyang began the reversal when Washington refused to finally remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the US Trading with the Enemy Act. The US demanded that North Korea first agree to a process for verifying the declaration the North had provided about its plutonium programme. Uncertainty about the health of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il solidifies the stalemate that is likely to continue at least until a new US president takes office.

Iraq/Afghanistan
The handing over of the command of US forces in Iraq this week brings to a close a very successful tour of duty for Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus presided over a decline in civil strife that saw the monthly tally for violent deaths fall from its peak of 3,500 Iraqi civilians killed in January 2007 to 550 in July 2008.

Violence has reduced in Anbar province, once the epicentre of the insurgency, to such an extent that responsibility for its security could be handed over to the Iraqi army and police force at the beginning of September. However, both Petraeus and his successor Odierno have been very cautious about the sustainability of these security gains.

The reasons for this pessimism are to be found in the lack of comparable progress in Iraqi politics. The position of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has certainly strengthened over 2008 and his popularity has increased after he deployed the army to both Basra and Mosul, Iraq's second and third largest cities, with a subsequent increase in security.

However, Maliki's growing power and confidence have not been matched by a growth of his support in the Iraqi parliament, the Council of Representatives. Maliki's continued rule is still dependent on a small but fractious coalition of two Shia Islamist parties and the two Kurdish parties. Crucial legislation needed to distribute Iraq's oil revenues and manage overdue provincial elections remains stuck in the parliament, hindered by a seeming inability of legislators and their party bosses to reach agreement on a number of key issues.

Overall there has been significant progress in Iraq during 2008. But for this to become irreversible Iraq's ruling elite need to find a way to compromise on political and revenue issues without resorting to extra-parliamentary violence. Successful provincial and national elections, both likely to take place in 2009, will determine whether gains can be sustained.

Attention in the meanwhile is migrating powerfully towards Afghanistan, where the many challenges in the country are compounded by the worsening situation in the Pakistan FATA.

New Pakistani President Zardari's top priority is to fight terrorism and Islamist militancy in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. But the Pakistani army remains unable or unwilling to counter effectively the resurgent Taliban with over 110,000 troops deployed in the area. With the Taliban controlling large swathes of the tribal areas and an increase in cross-border attacks taking place against coalition forces in Afghanistan, the US is now inclined to attack these 'safe havens' in an attempt to defeat the Taliban. An increase in US strikes by missile-armed unmanned aircraft, and the first ground assault by coalition special forces in the tribal areas during Ramadan on 3 September, resulted in public outrage in Pakistan. In a rare public statement, Pakistan's Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani condemned these attacks and stated that the country would be defended 'at all cost'.

Zardari's major challenge will be to gain the trust of the army and build a consensus against terrorism and Islamist extremism among the political establishment. To pursue the campaign on terror, he will need to balance the conflicting interests of growing US pressure for military strikes in the tribal areas with the Pakistani army's decreasing tolerance for such attacks. And, in order to reduce public opposition to such a policy, he needs to build bridges with the major opposition political parties. Most importantly, President Zardari will need to ensure that the ensuing domestic political turbulence, heightened by the growing economic crisis, does not place his own government at risk from the army.

Russia/Georgia and its Strategic Implications
The balance of evidence at present suggests that Georgia started this war having amassed troops on the border with South Ossetia on the morning of 7 August, and launching attacks on the capital Tskhinvali, before Russian tanks had passed through the Roki tunnel. Precise time lines may not be firmly established before the result of inquiries demanded by numerous bodies, including the US Congress. In any case, Bush administration officials freely acknowledge that they warned Georgia in forceful terms against initiating military action in South Ossetia and feel that that advice was ignored.

Georgia's apparent decision openly to reject the demands of its US patron not to seek to recover South Ossetia by force was clearly irresponsible. It raises the legitimate question as to whether, as a prospective aspirant member of a Western military alliance system, it would be a responsible member of that grouping if it were to fail to act in multilateral consultation with its supporters.

Russian reaction to the Georgian effort to place the frozen conflict of South Ossetia in a military microwave was disproportionately strong. The spread of its army through Georgia proper was unjustified by any immediate requirement to protect the South Ossetians on whose behalf Moscow claim to have acted. The establishment of multiple checkpoints all around Georgia was excessive. The destruction of parts of Georgian infrastructure was vindictive. The decision quickly to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia had a pre-emptive quality to it and has shown itself already to have created a diplomatic burden on Russia, especially in light of the near universal condemnation of the move. But the Russians were not aiming, as commentators and the president of Georgia later claimed, to change the map of post-war Europe. Russia's actions in Georgia, aggressive as they were, cannot be read as the European equivalent of Saddam Hussein's attempt to run over Kuwait in August 1990. What Moscow did intend was to draw a line at the extension of the Western sphere of strategic influence further eastwards. The West must decide whether, given its wider global agenda, and the specific need for collaboration with Russia over such issues as Afghanistan and Iran, locking horns with Russia is necessary.

As a practical matter, there is a high risk that the momentum of NATO enlargement policy will divide the West. Despite the fact that 20% of Georgia's territory is lost, the United States will probably argue for continuing the path towards eventual membership. It will do the same for Ukraine, even though the population of that country and its divided leadership is at best ambivalent, if not in the majority opposed, to NATO membership. Europeans have a strong case to argue that it is in NATO's strategic interest to pause its enlargement policy. While Russia has no veto on NATO membership, mere possession of a perceived threat is equally no automatic ticket to entry. Europe will want to invite the US to think strategically, not nostalgically, about the weight it wishes to attach to NATO enlargement in its regional policy. Georgia has weakened its case for NATO membership. It openly defied its main strategic patron, the US, by seeking to recover its lost territories, taking on a declared Russian interest without the ability to do so alone and then calling on the West to sort out the mess it created. Small allies pay a tax to larger strategic guarantors. In return for the promise of assistance, they must at least consult them.

NATO has set up commissions with Ukraine and Georgia and these must be allowed to work. In the meantime, the West has to think through what its true strategic interests are in the EU–NATO–Russia neighbourhood.

Dealing with Russia in the current circumstances is extremely difficult. It wants to assert its interests widely with greater force. It sometimes makes decisions based more on pique and anger than on strategic calculus and self-interest. Russia has made its bad temper almost an instrument of its foreign policy. Scowling at every affront to its status, it has revived the doctrine that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' as a guide to its diplomacy. But the West must not reply to this defiant mood through a form of strategic autism, advancing its interests blind to the emotional response that this can elicit from the Russian leadership.

A bit of old-fashioned sang froid is called for in these unfortunately quite old-fashioned strategic times. Russia is isolated even within its own declared sphere of influence. None of its partners in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation have recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia. China is appalled by Russia's validation of secessionist politics.

The West must develop a strategy that fills out the content of the policy of hard-headed engagement that is sometimes advertised. That means defining interests in the region and with Russia in a more clear-headed manner, distinguishing between the necessary and the desirable. It has been sometime since the West developed a truly specific Russia policy; perhaps it was not thought necessary in the immediate post-Cold War period: it is now.

Conclusion
The events of August 2008 do not signify fresh steps towards a new cold war because neither side wants one, and the stakes are too low to warrant one. They do mark the distinct end of the romantic phase of the post-Cold War order. Russia is not yet the liberal democratic power some both in Russia and outside wished for. But like everyone else, it is also subject to those forces of globalisation that can place a check on its progress. The most powerful remark made about Russia's actions in Georgia were not those made by the EU or NATO, but those made by the markets in wiping so much value off Russian stocks and effectively marking up Russia risk.

The next few months will see many preoccupied with the outcome of the US election. However much America's individual share of global power has been in relative decline, it remains the case that it is the 'swing' geopolitical player, the one that by its actions or inactions can have the most impact on the comity of nations and the stability of the international system as a whole. We are now entering an era, as Strategic Survey notes, where international diplomatic activity will be more plural. America is unable now to shape the international agenda alone and needs international partners. Those prospective partners, in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, or elsewhere, need to be more assertive in developing initiatives which the US can comfortably join, rather than merely react to proposals that may come from Washington. The quality of those initiatives will determine whether the post-unipolar moment will be more or less good for international peace and security.