The potential outcomes for Afghanistan

By Alex Shone, UK Defence Forum Research Associate in Residence

Despite progress made in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) intent to achieve its desired end-state remains entirely contingent on how ISAF and their opponents seize an array of challenges, opportunities, risks and impediments. Strategy to promote good governance and protect the Afghan people is sound but the conditions that govern its implementation are not. Afghanistan is a mission that is being continually impeded by numerous internal challenges.

However, this is not where the problem ends as many of these internal challenges and dynamics are sustained by external ones. Ultimately, the vested interests of Afghanistan's neighbours have obstructed and indeed have the potential to derail this strategy. The greatest opportunity to be seized is therefore in promoting and constructing cooperation around the common ground and mutual interests shared among the regional and international powers.

Strategic actors

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is unable to exercise the positive and legitimate governance, required by the mission, over its people due to a range of rampant detrimental factors.

None are greater than that of the systematic corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption ranges from an economic nature that includes extortion, "tax" contracts, and also the large scale diversion of foreign economic assistance. Criminal and patronage networks operate on an enormous and deeply-embedded scale in Afghanistan. An opaque system shrouds the central bidding and access to all major contracts, land purchases and government appointments. There is the direct funding of the insurgency from within the GIRoA as well as the facilitation or indeed even direction of illicit narcotics trafficking. Equally, petty corruption runs pretty freely across Afghanistan where shake downs and bribes are an element of daily life. Corruption has differing impacts according to its nature but all types ultimately de-legitimise the GIRoA.

Aside from corruption at the national level, but no less significant, is the subversion and breakdown of traditional governance structures at local levels. At the local level, the Khan traditionally sits in command of a community. However, on a wide scale their positions have been marginalised by powerbrokers and warlords. Tribal elders and Maliks have equally been marginalised by the Taliban, as well as by ISAF and the GIRoA. As such, it is the Taliban who are currently winning the fight for influence over the religious message in Afghanistan against an undermined tribal leadership.

The Afghan people have critically not turned against the presence of ISAF. However, and despite this positive, a popular crisis in confidence and disaffected populations has undermined governance in Afghanistan and has fuelled the growth of the insurgency. The social dynamics of the Afghan people are defined by their multi-polar ethnic composition. This is further complicated by their deep links to those respective tribal structures of the Afghanistan's neighbours in Pakistan, the Central Asian States and to the West.

The Afghan people have strong and very real grievances with the corruption and insecurity that they can see before them in their communities, within the authorities and their politicians. Afghans strongly protest the considerable inequality of development and opportunity throughout their country. This attacks deep beliefs in honour and integrity. Looming challenges are of the numbers of displaced people and refugees produced by the conflict. Urbanisation is a phenomenon that is being adjusted to as is a growing population of a disaffected youth.

The insurgents (INS) in Afghanistan comprise a large number of different groups, many of whom coordinate at the tactical and operational levels, and are facilitated, trained and funded by external actors. At the international level, supported and enabled by external actors, are the Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, transnational fighters, the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani Network. Coupled with these elements are major players from criminal and narcotics groups. At local levels, the insurgency comprises disenfranchised, illiterate and impoverished Afghan nationals who may be characterised as the so-called 'accidental guerrillas'. This category of INS comprises people who turn to insurgent activities because of the conditions of their environment; they are generally manipulated, coerced or compelled out of reasons of financial necessity.

The plan of attack open to the more hardcore actors of the insurgency is an extremely effective one that potentially has every chance of eventually succeeding. ISAF's stated mission objectives face considerable obstacle factors that are each in great part an outcome of insurgent counter measures. ISAF aims to protect the population; to enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); to neutralise malign influences; to support the extension of government and to support the socio-economic development of Afghanistan.

In direct contrast and opposition to these stated aims, the insurgency dominates the population that ISAF pledges to protect. Insurgents aim to break the will of the Coalition in view of stated ISAF deadlines, particularly with regard to those for a handover of responsibility to the ANSF. The insurgents aim to sustain their sanctuary and support from external state and non-state actors. They equally intend to undermine the GIRoA and local governance by promotion and manipulation of conditions of corruption, inequality, unemployment and poverty.

The strategic interests and enduring influence of external actors are of sufficient strength in Afghanistan to prevent overall success in the campaign plan.

Pakistan is the key external enabler of the insurgency in Afghanistan with the country's extremely deep and sensitive link via the Af-Pak border region comprising the North Western Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Afghanistan is a country of enormous and strategic value to Pakistan. Elements within it provide direct support in terms of protective sanctuary, training and some funding. Critically, ISAF's stated goals in Afghanistan are not friendly to Pakistan and yet Pakistan is extremely nervous of what will happen when ISAF withdraws from Afghanistan. India presents an existential threat to Pakistan and this in great part governs how Pakistan frames its policy and operations in Afghanistan.

Iran is keen to project several long-term interests into Afghanistan. They currently exercise a calibrated element of lethal support to the Afghan insurgency. Iranian support to the Afghan INS is not the same as it was to the Iraqi INS. Iran does not however want an extremist Pashtun government; it should be remembered that Iran is a near total Shi'a populace while Afghanistan is near universally Sunni. Iran is developing greater inroads of influence via media and trade with Afghanistan, notable is their transport infrastructure in Western Afghanistan. Lastly, Afghanistan is seen by Iran as a major intelligence gathering opportunity against many of its political, military and economic enemies. Ultimately, while Coalition troops, particularly the US, are embroiled in Afghanistan, the military options open to the US against the Iranian nuclear programme are greatly limited.

Challenges, risks, impediments and opportunities

The key challenges within Afghanistan for the Coalition are many. There is the need for the reduction of corruption and the management of conflict between powerbrokers. There must be a reversal in the crisis of popular confidence in ISAF and the GIRoA. Poverty and unemployment must be countered to reduce the number displaced peoples and refugees. The tight grip over Afghanistan exercised by criminal and narcotic groups must be reversed. The will of the international community must be maintained. Lastly, a popular buy-in for political processes and leadership must be made.

Aside from looming challenges, there are also some risks that must be considered. There is a considerable risk posed if the Taliban and affiliated groups were able to intensify the tempo of their campaign. Such a development, particularly the emergence of an 'Afghan Tet Offensive', would be extremely damaging to the progress made so far by ISAF. Equally, a chief risk is present of the Taliban playing for time under the guise of peace and reconciliation to encroach on ISAF deadlines. Lastly, a major deterioration in the regional security outlook could pose a grave risk to the campaign in Afghanistan.

ISAF must address these challenges and risks against some fundamental impediments that restrict freedom or scope for action. Key impediments are the influence of external actors, namely Pakistan and Iran, who have the actual potential to slow progress and prevent eventual success. Coupled with this is the internal factor that there is a lack of a popular buy-in to political processes and for effective leadership.

Great opportunities are, however, present in Afghanistan and must be seized. They include the country's considerable natural resources and mineral wealth. This wealth, if it could be accessed and distributed, could act as an enormous catalyst for development in Afghanistan. The improvements made in daily Afghan life, and also in the political infrastructure, should not be underestimated or discounted. Lastly, and most important of internal factors is that the Afghan people have not yet turned against ISAF and great efforts should be made to ensure that they do not do so.

There are regional opportunities encompassing shared desires among key neighbouring states for stability and economic growth in Afghanistan, the containment or removal of Al Qaeda or Islamic extremism as well as criminal and narcotics trafficking groups. Similarly, the increased regional demands for energy are directly and in great part contingent upon stability in Afghanistan to allow the realisation of a number of proposed projects that could offer substantial contribution to regional energy security.

'Game changers'

'Game changers' are defined as the factors that could swing in one or more directions and as yet cannot be calculated with any degree of reliable precision. They have the capacity to adversely or positively change the game plan in Afghanistan.

Any transformation within the GIRoA is one such factor; such as, if President Karzai were able to neutralise the influence of malign powerbroker elements. Equally, any breakdown of ethnic stability could potentially result in a partition of the state or even civil war. As already stated, the Afghan people are critical and so is their continued support for ISAF's mission. Any popular groundswell against or for the insurgency could be an enormous game changer for better or worse respectively.

Among external actors, labelled as critically to the outside conditions that impose themselves upon many of Afghanistan's internal circumstances, many potential gamer changers exist. A change in Pakistan's regional security calculus is another; such as, whether the insurgents' sanctuary and support were to be denied. Equally, any shift in Pakistan and India's relations with each other. Any deterioration in relations between Iran and the West that could result in an increased level of lethal Iranian support to the Afghan insurgency could change the conditions of the Afghan conflict.

The insurgents pose a game changer too. Clearly, if Al Qaeda were to be removed or eliminated from the region this would have dramatic implications for the insurgency. This could also encompass whether Al Qaeda's key members were to extricate themselves to new operational theatres elsewhere. So too would any changes and particularly any enduring fractures in the Taliban senior leadership.

Potential outcomes

Arguably, there are four 'war play' outcomes for Afghanistan;

(1)  The insurgency intensifies their operational tempo, externally aided by greater lethal support, waging in effect an 'Afghan Tet'.

(2)  A belligerent and resilient insurgency fights on as allowed by current and continuing external enablers.

(3)  A fractured or otherwise weakened insurgency fights on, still with the support of external enablers.

(4)  The insurgency is overmatched by the Coalition and elects to play for time by drawing out reconciliation processes to inconclusive ends beyond ISAF's self-imposed deadlines.

And three 'peace play' outcomes;

(1)  The Pashtun population of Afghanistan play for their own peace initiative without buy-in or engagement by other stakeholders.

(2)  The Taliban's senior leadership, in a top-down initiative, sues for genuine peace within negotiations influenced by Pakistan.

(3)  The local Taliban, in a bottom-up initiative, sues for genuine peace.