Ukraine in NATO - a useful addition?

By Adam Dempsey

Since independence in 1991 Ukraine has consistently sought closer ties with the West. Despite continuing economic cooperation with Russia, Ukrainian-EU exchanges now exceed those with its largest individual trading partner. As a consequence of the changing geopolitical realities of the 'post-Soviet space' Ukraine was also able to join NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994. One feature of this agreement was the creation in 1997 of a Ukrainian military mission to NATO. Opportunities for further bilateral cooperation with NATO were enhanced by Ukraine's de facto joining of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1999. Accordingly, the official pursuit of NATO membership since 2002 represents another opportunity for Ukraine to reconfigure its political space along Western rather than Russian lines.

As a result of closer relations with the West the Ukrainian military has therefore enjoyed extended periods of cooperation with NATO. Since 1993, for example, the Ukrainian and U.S. navies have cooperated within Exercise 'Sea Breeze.' These exercises seek to improve the bilateral combat effectiveness of both navies. In 2007 Ukraine entered its third year of participation within Exercise 'Rapid Trident.' Here Ukraine has been testing modern technologies to improve interoperability between units from countries such as Germany and Canada. Such exchanges reflect NATO's ongoing consensus that the end of the Cold War provided unique opportunities to build improved security within an extended Euro-Atlantic region. As a country of 233,090 square miles, NATO can also benefit from Ukraine's geopolitical location adjacent to Russia and the Middle East.

To further highlight NATO aspirations, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MOD) has since 2004 published a White Book outlining the current state of the armed forces. The White Book addresses issues relating to the implementation of the State Programme of the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011. The overarching theme of this programme is the formation of modern armed forces to defend national sovereignty and contribute to international security. Crucially these objectives will be met by the development of a more streamlined, fully-professional military. These initiatives seek to overcome Ukraine's first attempts in the 1990s at military reform. As Soviet-style thinking prevailed in governmental institutions the Ukrainian military was rebuilt along Soviet-lines. Reforms resulted in bloated military structures geared to meeting Cold War concerns. In seeking to address this problem the White Book indicates that the development of European command-and-control processes is vital.

In attempting to meet such demands the White Book begins by emphasising that Ukraine has largely met its targets for professionalised services by 2007. This has been achieved via such initiatives as increased pay, access to higher education and service housing. As of 2004 the Ukrainian military roughly consisted of one officer for every three enlisted soldiers. By 2006, however, the number of serving officers was reduced by 28%. Implementing a pyramid distribution of officers benefits Ukraine's commitment to the development of a quality officer corps. Continuous education at tactical, operational and strategic levels has now been introduced for all officers. Further initiatives seek to increase the use of foreign languages associated with NATO. Key to this has been the retention of officers with peacekeeping experience and those trained at overseas institutions.

To match the streamlining of its officer corps, Ukraine's armed forces have been reduced to 191,000 personnel. This stands in contrast to the 800,000 personnel in place after previous reform efforts. Such downsizing therefore allows Ukraine to further optimise professionalisation with the development of a two-tier, mission-oriented structure for its armed forces. This initiative distinguishes the military between Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) and Main Defence Forces (MDF). The JRRF seeks to develop three professional service brigades to be prioritised training, personnel development and funding. Such prioritisation is to ensure that the JRRF is equipped with state-of-art hardware to be deployed in multinational formations. To complement these changes Ukraine's Joint Operational Command (JOC) recently established a Peacekeeping Operations Centre. Ukraine is confident that the overall structures of the JOC's functions are compatible with NATO.

It is expected that the MDF will focus solely upon territorial defence. Yet its mixture of contract and conscript personnel highlights potential long-term problems the Ukrainian military faces. Currently Ukraine's conscription policy exempts over 90% of the relevant manpower pool from military service. Furthermore, roughly only 30% of conscripts have completed secondary education. These statistics suggest difficultie in making progress in the development of a professional military force. In particular, the prospects for conscript personnel to successfully complete first-tier training to progress into the JRRF seem poor. Such problems are likely to be exacerbated by wider demographic concerns. Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine's population has declined from over 50 million to 46 million. A concurrent eightfold increase in the death of working-age males makes this group responsible for 25% of Ukraine's annual mortality figures. This group also makes up the bulk of the estimated 7 million Ukrainians currently working abroad.

A further problem applicable to both the JRRF and MDF is the lack of significant government funding. Between 2000 and 2004 it was estimated that the Ukrainian military was under-funded by 35-60%. To remedy this problem the Chief of General Staff announced plans in early 2008 to allocate £1.5 billion to reequip the military to 2011. Yet by July the MOD announced that plans for the allocation of new hardware and research and development initiatives were under-funded by roughly 50%. Such under-funding makes the White Book's objectives for the provision of equipment all the more important. Despite 2007 seeing the introduction of 24 new weapons compatible with NATO standards, Ukraine continues to maintain combat readiness via the prolongation of weapons already in service. By 2007 the service life had been prolonged for 39 pieces of equipment, with a particular focus upon combat aircraft, tanks and light-armoured vehicles.

In October a report by the Kiev-based Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies highlighted problems facing the MOD's prolongation initiatives. Of all the hardware currently utilised by Ukraine's ground troops 93% has been in service for over fifteen years. The current state of Ukraine's air-forces is also questionable. Of the 172 aircraft available an estimated 37% are not combat-ready. The Centre's analysis of the Navy is also pessimistic. Many of Ukraine's vessels are plagued by engine malfunctions and problems with radar and weapons systems. Whilst Ukraine recently held exercises to demonstrate that the military can cope with an invasion, the Centre also highlights notable problems. During exercises in Eastern Ukraine the operation of BUK-M1 and S-300 strategic missile systems failed. One explanation given for the problems facing Ukraine's military hardware is that intended time limits for service have now past. This affects the availability of resources required to ensure effective implementation of prolongation initiatives.

It is also unlikely that Ukraine's military-industrial complex will offer an effective solution to the problem of re-equipment. In July the Committee for National Security and Defence Issues indicated that Ukraine's defence-industry complexes are only capable of producing 8% of hardware required to equip the armed forces. Plans, for example, to develop a new corvette have been hampered by the state of Ukrainian shipyards. To meet such projects the Committee further emphasised that most large-scale manufacturing facilities require redevelopment. Yet such investment is unlikely to be forthcoming from the government. In September Ukraine's pro-Western coalition collapsed. This was caused by differences between President Yushenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko regarding Russia's use of military force in Georgia. Such a divide reflects that any government needs to consider the opinion of Eastern Ukraine. Here Ukrainians have much stronger ties with Russia than the West. East Ukraine is likely to account for the 30% currently opposed to NATO membership. Thus as the situation in Ukraine remains unpredictable, NATO aspirations are likely to be eclipsed by more pragmatic considerations.

Conclusions

With over fifteen year's experience of cooperation, NATO clearly sees Ukraine as a valuable partner. Such exchanges have contributed to Ukraine's armed forces general redevelopment to reflect the desire for NATO membership. As a consequence of greater cooperation with the West in general, Ukraine has provided support to peacekeeping in such countries as Liberia and Iraq. Such activities demonstrate that Ukraine is keen to be regarded as the type of security provider befitting of NATO membership.

Yet Ukraine remains beset by interrelated problems which compromise its overall value to NATO. Despite attempts to create armed forces geared toward contemporary threats, the Ukrainian military remains subject to under-investment. By attempting to ameliorate this problem by prolonging equipment usage Ukraine would potentially bring to NATO hardware that is not entirely suitable to current concerns. This may also be matched by the eventual introduction of personnel that mainly lacks training and experience to be of immediate use. Moreover, national and regional political concerns hamper prospects for Ukraine to make better use of resources to address these problems.

As a result Ukraine is unlikely to become a fully-fledged member of NATO any time soon.

.hmmessage P { margin:0px; padding:0px } body.hmmessage { font-size: 10pt; font-family:Verdana } Adam DEmpsey holds an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from the University of Salford. He is particularly interested in the security policies of the former Soviet Union, China, South Asia and Latin America. Other research interests include the impact of disease on global security.